UPDATED 19 MAY
http://www.fox5ny.com/news/hotel-pools-linked-to-many-disease-outbreaks
Hotel pools linked to many disease
outbreaks
A study from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention find a third of all recreational waterborne
disease outbreaks occurred in hotel pools or hot tubs and
water play venues.
Between 2000 and 2014 the CDC recorded nearly 500 disease
outbreaks related to recreational water use that resulted
in more than 27,000 illnesses and eight deaths.
Hotels were the leading setting, associated with 157 of
the outbreaks...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=124&v=E_He0650klE
https://srsroccoreport.com/the-shale-oil-ponzi-scheme-explained-how-lousy-shale-economics-will-pull-down-the-u-s-economy/
THE SHALE OIL PONZI SCHEME EXPLAINED:
How Lousy Shale Economics Will Pull Down The U.S.
Economy
Few Americans realize that the U.S. economy is being
propped up by the Shale Oil Industry. However, the
shale oil industry is nothing more than a Ponzi Scheme, so
when it collapses, it will take down the U.S. economy with
it. Unfortunately, the reason few Americans
understand how lousy the economics are in producing shale
oil and gas is due to the misinformation and propaganda
being put out by the industry and energy analysts.
I am quite surprised how bank analysts and brokerage firms
can continue to fund the shale oil and gas or advise
clients to purchase stock when the industry is behaving
just like the Bernie Madoff Ponzi Scheme. The only
big difference is that the U.S. Shale Industry is a Ponzi
at least four times greater than Madoff’s $65 billion
fiasco...
https://shaleprofile.com/
https://pjmedia.com/trending/yahoo-and-aol-can-now-read-your-emails-access-your-bank-records/
Yahoo and AOL Just Gave Themselves the Right to
Read Emails, Access Bank Records
http://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/americas-is-in-her-final-days-and-this-is-her-last-line-of-defense/
America’s Is In Her Final Days and
This Is Her Last Line of Defense
Why There Must
Be a Guerrilla War
There are a total of 1,455,375 active personnel in the US
military. The United States has over 200,000 troops
stationed in 144 countries. These 200,000 men and women
will not likely be a factor in the coming conflict and
will prove to be in grave danger in the coming conflict.
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/the_age_of_petty_tyrannies
The Age of Petty Tyrannies
By John W.
Whitehead
“Whether the mask is labeled fascism,
democracy, or dictatorship of the proletariat, our great
adversary remains the apparatus—the bureaucracy, the
police, the military. Not the one facing us across the
frontier of the battle lines, which is not so much our
enemy as our brothers’ enemy, but the one that calls
itself our protector and makes us its slaves. No matter
what the circumstances, the worst betrayal will always be
to subordinate ourselves to this apparatus and to trample
underfoot, in its service, all human values in ourselves
and in others.”—Simone Weil, French philosopher and
political activist
We labor today under the weight of countless tyrannies,
large and small, carried out in the name of the national
good by an elite class of government officials who are
largely insulated from the ill effects of their actions.
We, the middling classes, are not so fortunate.
We find ourselves badgered, bullied and browbeaten into
bearing the brunt of their arrogance, paying the price for
their greed, suffering the backlash for their militarism,
agonizing as a result of their inaction, feigning
ignorance about their backroom dealings, overlooking their
incompetence, turning a blind eye to their misdeeds,
cowering from their heavy-handed tactics, and blindly
hoping for change that never comes.
The overt signs of the despotism exercised by the
increasingly authoritarian regime that passes itself off
as the United States government are all around us:
warrantless surveillance of Americans’ private phone and
email conversations by the NSA; SWAT team raids of
Americans’ homes; shootings of unarmed citizens by police;
harsh punishments meted out to schoolchildren in the name
of zero tolerance; drones taking to the skies
domestically; endless wars; out-of-control spending;
militarized police; roadside strip searches; roving TSA
sweeps; privatized prisons with a profit incentive for
jailing Americans; fusion centers that collect and
disseminate data on Americans’ private transactions; and
militarized agencies with stockpiles of ammunition, to
name some of the most appalling.
Yet as egregious as these incursions on our rights may be,
it’s the endless, petty tyrannies inflicted on an
overtaxed, overregulated, and underrepresented populace
that occasionally nudge a weary public out of their numb
indifference and into a state of outrage.
Consider, for example, that federal and state governments
now require on penalty of a fine that individuals apply
for permission before they can grow exotic orchids, host
elaborate dinner parties, gather friends in one’s home for
Bible studies, give coffee to the homeless, let their kids
manage a lemonade stand, keep chickens as pets, or braid
someone’s hair, as ludicrous as that may seem... [ Cont'd
]
https://sputniknews.com/business/201801191060881605-kasperskaya-bitcoin-us-intelligence/
Bitcoin is a 'Project of US
Intelligence,' Kaspersky Lab Co-Founder Claims
Natalya Kaspersky claimed that Bitcoin was designed to
provide financing for US and British intelligence
activities around the world. The expert called the
cryptocurrency "dollar 2.0."...
Blaargh...
https://www.eatthis.com/
https://www.eatthis.com/donald-trump-eating-habits/?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=MGID-IM&utm_campaign=mgid-im&utm_term=5627352s3418&utm_content=2514192
12 Things Trump Does When He Dines
Out
The Secret Service might be making
some runs to McDonald's.
By
Brittany Anas
https://www.tohoku.ac.jp/en/press/eyes_in_the_back_of_the_head.html
The brain may perceive objects outside of our
view - Eyes in the back of the head
Implicit Learning
Experimental setup to investigate implicit learning of
surroundings.
Spatial representations of surroundings, including those
outside the visual field, are crucial for guiding movement
in a three-dimensional world. The visual system appears to
provide sufficient information for movement despite our
visual field being limited to the frontal region. However,
this theory had not been scientifically tested until now.
A group led by Professor Satoshi Shioiri from the Research
Institute of Electrical Communication at Tohoku University
in Japan, used a visual search experiment to demonstrate
that the human visual system indeed has the ability to
perceive things beyond the limits of the visual field....
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/may/14/new-chemical-compound-stops-common-cold-in-its-tracks-rhinovirus
Scientists stop rhinovirus in its
tracks, but a cure for common cold still a long way off
Nikola K S Davis
...The trick, the authors say, is to develop drugs that
interact with one of the enzymes within our cells - an
approach that makes it harder for the virus to become
drug-resistant.
"Viruses hijack the host to make more copies of themselves.
This enzyme is one of the host enzymes that the virus
hijacks," said Roberto Solari, visiting professor at the
National Heart and Lung Institute, Imperial College London,
and a co-author of the study.
Writing in the journal Nature Chemistry, a team of researchers
based around the UK report how they looked at molecules that
interact with a human enzyme that attaches a type of fatty
acid molecule on to proteins. While two of these molecules on
their own had little effect on the enzyme, the team found that
when they were chemically stitched together they became
remarkably potent in preventing the enzyme from working as
normal.
Solari said that is important, since the virus uses the enzyme
to assemble the protein coat which surrounds the genetic
material of the virus.
"What we found is if we block the addition of this fat, the
coat doesn't assemble so the virus doesn't package its genes
into its coat," he said. "The virus still makes its own genes,
it makes the coat, but the coat can't assemble so the virus
can't replicate - you actually don't make infectious
particles."
The team say the molecule appears to completely prevent the
virus from replicating, whether it is added one hour before,
one hour after or at the same time as the cells are infected,
and that it remains effective up to three hours after
infection. The approach was also found to prevent the
replication of other viruses in the same family as rhinovirus
- including polio and foot-and-mouth disease....
...tests have so far only been carried out on human cells in a
dish...
https://www.rt.com/news/427036-crimean-bridge-time-lapse/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=170&v=hDbR-_tEmr4
27 months in 3 minutes: How
Russia built Europe’s longest bridge
(TIMELAPSE VIDEO)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJNgpVTec2k
[ @ 4:00 -- Israel Created Hamas ]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDRPZclNf98
George Galloway explaining to a Jew
that they have no right in Palestine
The Balfour Declaration of 1917 (dated 2 November 1917) was a
letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur
James Balfour to Baron Rothschild (Walter Rothschild, 2nd
Baron Rothschild), a leader of the British Jewish community,
for transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain
and Ireland. His Majesty's government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews
in any other country. The statement was issued through the
efforts of Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, the principal
Zionist leaders based in London; as they had asked for the
reconstitution of Palestine as "the" Jewish national home, the
declaration fell short of Zionist expectations. "He who
passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who
helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without protesting
against it is really cooperating with it." - Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. "If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you
have chosen the side of the oppressor" Bishop Desmond Tutu
"Every time anyone says that Israel is our only friend in the
Middle East, I can't help but think that before Israel, we had
no enemies in the Middle East." Fr. John Sheehan of the Jesuit
Order
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sG6yzQ1Sm-o&feature=youtu.be
SHOCKING! What Every Christian Needs To
Know About Islam
Sheila is joined by Leo Hohmann, author of Stealth Invasion,
and they blow the lid off of why Americans have been kept
largely in the dark about the radical plans to permanently
transform their nation.
https://medium.com/@matteozago/why-the-net-giants-are-worried-about-the-web-3-0-44b2d3620da5
Why the net giants are worried about
the Web 3.0
CN102144757
Bean sprout production method based on audio-frequency
control technology
Inventor(s): SONGMING ZHU; WEIMING CAI; HUINONG HE; MINSHENG
ZHOU, et al.
Applicant(s): UNIV ZHEJIANG
The invention discloses a bean sprout production method based
on an audio-frequency control technology...
Summary of the Invention
The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the
deficiencies of the prior art and provide a method for
producing bean sprouts based on audio frequency regulation
technology.
The method for producing bean sprouts based on the audio
frequency modulation technology is: 5 growth stages of bean
sprouts with foaming species, small buds, two buds, middle
buds and long vegetables;
In the foaming stage, the water is changed every 3 hours or
so, and the water temperature is Controlled at 23 ~ 24 °C,
while applying the frequency of 3000 ~ 3500hz, the volume of
the sound waves in the 80 ~ 100db continuous stimulation, the
stimulation time is 9 ~ 12 hours;
In the small bud stage, once every 2 hours watering, water
temperature Control at 27 ~ 28 °C, while applying the
frequency of 1500 ~ 2000hz, the sound volume of 80 ~ 100db of
the sound waves for continuous stimulation, stimulation time
of 21 to 24 hours;
In the second bud stage, once every 2 hours watering, water
temperature Control at 27 ~ 28 °C, while applying the
frequency of 1500 ~ 2000hz, the volume of 80db-100db sound
waves for continuous stimulation, stimulation time of 9 to 12
hours;
In bud stage, every 2 hours watering once, water temperature
Control at 29 ~ 30 °C, while applying the frequency of 2000 ~
2500hz, the volume of sound waves of 80 ~ 100db for continuous
stimulation, stimulation time is 21 to 24 hours;
In the long vegetable stage, watering once every 2 hours,
water temperature Control at 30 to 31 °C, simultaneous
application Frequency of 2000 ~ 2500hz, the volume of 80 ~
100db continuous acoustic stimulus, the time is 9 to 12 hours.
The bean sprouts are mung bean sprouts, bean sprouts, black
bean sprouts or peanut bean sprouts.
Example 1 ... the production of bean sprouts based on the
present invention can be found to increase by more than 10%.
Example 2 ... the yield of the bean sprouts produced based on
the present invention can be found to increase by more than
18%.
Example 3 ... the production of bean sprouts based on the
present invention increased by more than 15%.
From: Mbking42 <mbking42@aol.com> [Add to Address
Book]
Subject: Finally a Car that Runs on Water, Webcast
The inventor I believe that made the breakthrough, Walter
Jenkins, will be on a webcast tonight:
https://www.theothersideofmidnight.com/2018-05-05_walterjenkins/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNzW0zN7XzM
Nietzsche’s Prediction About the Jews
A fascinating section of “Daybreak”. Take away from it what
you will.
P.S. I don't think this prediction is pro or anti-semitic.
Nietzsche is just telling what he thinks will happen from as
"objective" a standpoint as possible.
"I wish Karl would start accumulating capital instead of just
writing about it." -- Karl Marx' mother
UPDATED 17 MAY
Heaps mo' Snacks for Thought
!
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/05/180516123644.htm
New device could increase battery life
of electronics by a hundred-fold
Among the chief complaints for smartphone, laptop and other
battery-operated electronics users is that the battery life is
too short and -- in some cases -- that the devices generate
heat. Now, a group of physicists led by Deepak K. Singh,
associate professor of physics and astronomy at the University
of Missouri, has developed a device material that can address
both issues. The team has applied for a patent for a magnetic
material that employs a unique structure -- a "honeycomb"
lattice that exhibits distinctive electronic properties...
"Semiconductor diodes and amplifiers, which often are made of
silicon or germanium, are key elements in modern electronic
devices," said Singh, who also serves as the principal
investigator of the Magnetism and Superconductivity Research
Laboratory at MU. "A diode normally conducts current and
voltage through the device along only one biasing direction,
but when the voltage is reversed, the current stops. This
switching process costs significant energy due to dissipation,
or the depletion of the power source, thus affecting battery
life. By substituting the semiconductor with a magnetic
system, we believed we could create an energetically effective
device that consumes much less power with enhanced
functionalities."
Singh's team developed a two-dimensional, nanostructured
material created by depositing a magnetic alloy, or permalloy,
on the honeycomb structured template of a silicon surface. The
new material conducts unidirectional current, or currents that
only flow one way. The material also has significantly less
dissipative power compared to a semiconducting diode, which is
normally included in electronic devices.
The magnetic diode paves the way for new magnetic transistors
and amplifiers that dissipate very little power, thus
increasing the efficiency of the power source. This could mean
that designers could increase the life of batteries by more
than a hundred-fold. Less dissipative power in computer
processors could also reduce the heat generated in laptop or
desktop CPUs.
"Although more works need to be done to develop the end
product, the device could mean that a normal 5-hour charge
could increase to more than a 500-hour charge," Singh said.
"The device could also act as an 'on/off switch' for other
periphery components such as closed-circuit cameras or radio
frequency attenuators, which reduces power flowing through a
device. We have applied for a U.S. patent and have begun the
process of incorporating a spin-off company to help us take
the device to market."
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/aelm.201700500
Advanced Electronic Materials, 2018; 4 (5): 1700500
DOI: 10.1002/aelm.201700500
Magnetic Diode Behavior at Room
Temperature in 2D Honeycombs.
Brock Summers, Ashutosh Dahal, Deepak K. Singh
Abstract
The magnetic analog of a semiconductor diode, demonstrating
unidirectional electrical transport, is a highly desirable
functionality for spintronics application, as it can play a
dual role as magnetic memory device and logic element.
However, creating such a functional material or device with
operation ability at room temperature in the absence of any
external tuning parameter, for instance a magnetic field, is a
challenge till date. In this study, the finding of
semiconductor diode-type rectification in a 2D honeycomb
lattice, made of an ultrasmall permalloy magnet with a typical
length of ˜12 nm is reported. The unidirectional electrical
transport behavior, characterized by the asymmetric colossal
enhancement in differential conductivity at a modest current
application of ˜10–15 µA, persists to T = 300 K in honeycomb
lattice of a moderate thickness of ˜6 nm. Importantly, the
unidirectional biasing arises without the application of a
magnetic field with an output power, ˜30 nW, by three orders
of magnitude smaller than a semiconductor junction diode.
Together, these properties provide a new vista for spintronics
research.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/advs.201700856\
Advanced Science, 2018; 5 (4): 1700856
DOI: 10.1002/advs.201700856
Spin Solid versus Magnetic Charge
Ordered State in Artificial Honeycomb Lattice of Connected
Elements.
Artur Glavic, et al.
Abstract
The nature of magnetic correlation at low temperature in
two-dimensional artificial magnetic honeycomb lattice is a
strongly debated issue. While theoretical researches suggest
that the system will develop a novel zero entropy spin solid
state as T ? 0 K, a confirmation to this effect in artificial
honeycomb lattice of connected elements is lacking. This study
reports on the investigation of magnetic correlation in newly
designed artificial permalloy honeycomb lattice of ultrasmall
elements, with a typical length of ˜12 nm, using neutron
scattering measurements and temperature-dependent
micromagnetic simulations. Numerical modeling of the polarized
neutron reflectometry data elucidates the
temperature-dependent evolution of spin correlation in this
system. As temperature reduces to ˜7 K, the system tends to
develop novel spin solid state, manifested by the alternating
distribution of magnetic vortex loops of opposite chiralities.
Experimental results are complemented by temperature-dependent
micromagnetic simulations that confirm the dominance of spin
solid state over local magnetic charge ordered state in the
artificial honeycomb lattice with connected elements. These
results enable a direct investigation of novel spin solid
correlation in the connected honeycomb geometry of 2D
artificial structure.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pm_HkficwQA
George Galloway tears into Donald Trump
over Iran nuclear deal decision in opening rant.
George called him "a certifiable madman who has just strapped
the world into a roller coaster cart which is headed for war."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddFvjfvPnqk
NASA Live Stream - Earth From Space
(Full Screen) | ISS LIVE FEED
target="_blank"
http://rense.com/general96/ebola-the-congo-already-had-120-deaths-in-march.html
Ebola - The Congo Already Had 120
Deaths In March
By Patricia Doyle PhD
http://www.isid.org
https://www.challenges.fr/monde/cor-plus-de-120-deces-inexpliques-dans-le-nord-est-de-la-rd-congo_586640
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-does-ebola-keep-showing-up-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
http://www.who.int/news-room/detail/11-05-2018-who-and-partners-working-with-national-health-authorities-to-contain-new-ebola-outbreak-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/05/ebola-outbreak-drc-three-four-months/560237/
Ebola Treatments
* Cobalt Hexamine vs Ebola ** Ebola Patents **
ROWEN : Ozone vs Ebola **
Ozone
Therapy *
https://www.veteranstoday.com/2018/05/12/netanyahu-to-putin-iran-seeks-to-destroy-6-million-jews/
Netanyahu to Putin: Iran seeks to
destroy 6 million Jews
No matter how you cut it, Netanyahu lacks the moral and
political backbone to be a head of a state.
by Jonas E. Alexis
You can’t make this stuff up: Netanyahu, the problem child in
the Middle East, has told Vladimir Putin that Iran has vowed
to annihilate six million Jews! If you think that Netanyahu
would never come up with something so dumb, then you are
underestimating Netanyahu’s fantastical imagination. This is
his exact word:
“There is a country in the Middle East, Iran, which calls for
the destruction of another 6 million Jews.”[1]
No one with an ounce of brain cells knocking together would
invent such a stupid statement. The simple fact is that
outside of Israel, Iran has the largest Jewish population in
the Middle East. Moreover, “Jews feel safer in Iran than in US
& EU despite Tel Aviv-Tehran tensions.”[2] And they have
been there for centuries! How does Iran plan to annihilate
those people? Who is Netanyahu really fooling this time? his
finest puppet (Donald Trump)?
When Netanyahu made similar statements back in 2015, Iranian
officials responded by saying: “It is truly, truly regrettable
that bigotry gets to the point of making allegations against
an entire nation which has saved Jews three times in its
history…”[3]...
target="_blank"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1197&v=JFLepaay-4A
The Dark & Delusional World of
Benjamin Netanyahu
Netanyahu is a criminal and the world knows it but Americans
keep on giving him their tax dollars so he can kill more
non-Jews. So who is to blame? Netanyahu or Americans for being
so stupid? You answer the question.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaL3E0KNxN8
The Exclusive Interview with Joel
Skousen: The "US War on Terror" and coming WW3
Joel Skousen is the Renowned author of Strategic Relocation -
he's a political scientist and commentator and expert in
geopolitics.
This two hour interview in which we cover a wide range of
topics, from the US created "War on Terror", the build-up to
WW3, false-flag school shootings, ISIS, martial law,
underground military bases, space wars, Russia, China, North
Korea and much more...
target="_blank"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saCdvAp5cow
How a Single Swedish Submarine Defeated
the US Navy
Interesting comments too :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1OgMXKJ4T8
Jerusalem, the Cup of Trembling That
Intoxicates the World
https://www.ewg.org/foodnews/dirty-dozen.php
Dirty Dozen -- EWG's 2018 Shopper's
Guide to Pesticides in Produce
1. Strawberries
2. Spinach
3. Nectarines
4. Apples
5. Grapes
6. Peaches
7. Cherries
8. Pears
9. Tomatoes
10. Celery
11. Potatoes
12. Sweet Bell Peppers
* A small amount of sweet corn, papaya and summer squash sold
in the United States is produced from genetically modified
seeds...
https://www.wired.com/story/darpas-next-challenge-a-grueling-underground-journey/
Darpa's Next Challenge? A Grueling
Underground Journey
https://www.darpa.mil/program/darpa-subterranean-challenge
DARPA Subterranean (SubT) Challenge
Dr. Timothy Chung
The DARPA Subterranean (SubT) Challenge aims to develop
innovative technologies that would augment operations
underground. The SubT Challenge will explore new approaches to
rapidly map, navigate, search, and exploit complex underground
environments, including human-made tunnel systems, urban
underground, and natural cave networks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WtItcUKAI&bpctr=1526497085
TRUMP IS THE SWAMP / Trump's Jewish
Elite MAFIA & The 5 Dancing Israelis
How much proof does it take for America to see who is ruling
her? How much proof does it take for Americans to see who
Donald Trump really is? This does not mean that Hillary would
have been better, it simply means that there has always been a
plan in place. They are all sucking America dry, while the
Goyim continue to think they have a savior.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3O2qCQU7Cac
How To Hügelkultur AMAZING Grow Method
For Raised Beds Vegetable Gardens - Organic & Cheap
This is how I build a Hugelkultur raised bed vegetable garden
or in other words mound culture/hill culture whereby soil is
mounded over logs, sticks, and other organic materials to
create a superior growing area for fruit and vegetables.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wc1mZf7SWAA
George Galloway Vs EVERYONE (MEGA
Compilation!)
This guy never take a day off from constantly arguing with
anything that moves!! lol pretty funny tho! enjoy!
UPDATED 13 MAY
Heaps mo' Snacks for Thought !
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=D1WZrnCcH24
Cancer cells destroyed by First Immune
GcMAF (gcmaf.eu)
David Noakes
GcMAF eradicates cancer; cells seen via microscopes and
time lapse photography.
This is a world wide first, and a scientific research paper
named "Multifaceted immunotherapeutic effects of GcMAF on
human breast cancer cells" peer reviewed, and published by us
in the January 2013 Immunology Conference in San Diego.
Human MCF7 breast cancer cells are shown both in a corrugated
layer on the surface below, and as irregular "fingers" above.
Macrophages are small round circles added at the bottom left.
They do nothing until the First Immune GcMAF is added.
Time lapse photography over 60 hours shows the cancer
monolayer below first changing from corrugated to smooth from
the bottom left as the cancer is destroyed; then the cancer
"fingers" are also eaten and destroyed by the macrophages.
This is part of the assays performed on batches of our GcMAF,
and are carried out in First Immune (gcmaf.eu's) laboratories
as part of our everyday production.
We supply 5,000 patients, 300 doctors in 30 nations.
This confirms the research paper "Effects of vitamin D-binding
protein-derived macrophage-activating factor on human breast
cancer cells," published in the journal Anticancer Research
2012 Jan;32(1):45-52, in which they also kindly used our First
Immune GcMAF for their experiments.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmvCRoIbObE
How to Make GcMAF at Home
Tutorial on making GcMAF at home for a fraction of the
cost. Please subscribe to our channel for more future videos
and valuable information.
[ & Comments ]
Biosludge "Fertilizer" =
Cannibalism+Cancercide :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkNoqTAGTag
CounterThink with Mike Adams: Dr. David
Lewis BioSludge Warning
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5701167/Scientists-baffled-discovering-signs-elusive-time-crystals-kids-toy.html
Scientists baffled after discovering
signs of elusive time crystals in a kids' toy
[ MAP : MonoAmmonium Phosphate ]
Hipstar Travel Pack
http://www.artmatrix.us/
The best hands-free travel cart that
goes wherever adventure takes you!..
ART MATRIX LLC is developing the HipStar™, a product that
will change the way hikers, campers, backpackers move by
literally taking the weight off their shoulders...
According to the Mountain Tactical Institute’s research,
there are five “thumb rules” discovered:
1) One pound on your feet equals five pounds on your back.
2) One pound on your feet equals five percent more energy
expended.
3) Every one percent of your body weight makes you six seconds
slower per mile.
4) Ten percent grade incline cuts your speed in half.
5) Going up slows you down twice as much as going down speeds
you up. Every percent of incline adds 15 seconds to your mile
pace. Every percent of decline takes 8 sec. off of your mile
pace. ..
HipStar™? solves a basic problem in five unique ways:
In a professional or military setting, the HipStar™ can be
used to transport vital equipment and supplies over almost any
terrain by rolling it on the ground or carrying it on the
target="_blank" user’s back.
?According to the Mountain Tactical Institute’s research,
there are five “thumb rules” discovered:
1) One pound on your feet equals five pounds on your back.
2) One pound on your feet equals five percent more energy
expended.
3) Every one percent of your body weight makes you six seconds
slower per mile.
4) Ten percent grade incline cuts your speed in half.
5) Going up slows you down twice as much as going down speeds
you up. Every percent of incline adds 15 seconds to your mile
pace. Every percent of decline takes 8 sec. off of your mile
pace.
??What is the weight limits of 'HipStar'?
The HipStar™ will be available in three versions: Light,
Medium, and Heavy-duty. The heavy-duty model can easily hold
up to 80 lbs (or even more) of gear with only 6-8 lbs. of
force in cart mode. It can be used by military or heavy
hikers/tourists. This group is used to carry large heavy
backpacks (50-60 lbs.) ..
?1. How do you make fifty pounds feel like one pound?A
suitcase balances a lot of weight on one axle - the same
design used in the HipStar.
2. How do you keep your hands free?...The HipStar attaches to
your hip and leaves enough room behind you so your heels don’t
hit it when you are walking or running.
3. How do you keep it from bumping into you when you walk?...
The HipStar’s shock absorbers and flexible harness even out
those disturbing walking motions for a comfortable experience.
4. What do you do when you hit uneven terrain?The HipStar
folds down into a backpack in seconds...
US9365224
COLLAPSIBLE CARRYING DEVICE
Inventor: KOSHUTIN IGOR [US]
A collapsible and expandable carrying device for pulling,
carrying, or otherwise transporting luggage, cargo, or any
other items. The carrying device comprises a frame comprised
of and combined with additional telescopic rods for adjustment
of parameters for ease of use. The frame is pivotally attached
to a handle, support straps, shoulder straps, and/or a belt to
be attached to a user's waist. The device is meant for both
short and long travel, and it allows for a user to vary angles
and lengths of the constituent parts in order to minimize
gravitational load on the user and optimize the force of the
center of gravity from the load being carried.
Owwwy ! Owwwy ! Nuke Evile Palestine !!! Philistines 2 :
Vaganal Hebes 0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=66&v=bjBK7wTeLCU
Palestinians take down 2 IDF drones
with rocks and slingshots
http://www.businessinsider.com/carbon-dioxide-record-human-health-effects-2018-5
The amount of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere just hit its highest level in 800,000 years and
scientists predict deadly consequences
Kevin Loria
The average concentration of carbon dioxide in Earth's
atmosphere just topped 410 parts per million, according to
measurements from Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.
It's the highest CO2 level in the 800,000 years for which we
have good data.
This is expected to have a catastrophic target="_blank" effect
on human health and the planet itself.
...For the first time in recorded history, the average monthly
level of CO2 in the atmosphere exceeded 410 parts per million
in April, according to observations at the Mauna Loa
Observatory in Hawaii.../
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BUUy1C0_4g
Hillary Clinton Exposed, Movie She
Banned From Theaters Full Movie
https://www.thecollegefix.com/post/44834/
Many studies’ results cannot be
reproduced, scholars warn
Mark McGreal - UCLA
https://www.nas.org/projects/irreproducibility_report
The NAS published the full report The Irreproducibility
Crisis of Modern Science: Causes, Consequences, and the Road
to Reform on April 17, 2018. We invite readers to consider our
findings and submit responses in the form of articles via
email to contact@nas.org. These articles will be posted on the
home page as well as in the Forum section below.
A reproducibility crisis afflicts a wide range of scientific
and social-scientific disciplines, from epidemiology to social
psychology. Improper use of statistics, arbitrary research
techniques, lack of accountability, political groupthink, and
a scientific culture biased toward producing positive results
together have produced a critical state of affairs. Many
supposedly scientific results cannot be reproduced in
subsequent investigations.
This study examines the different aspects of the
reproducibility crisis of modern science. The report also
includes a series of policy recommendations, scientific and
political, for alleviating the reproducibility crisis.
http://www.naturalmedicine.net.nz/
The New Zealand Journal of Natural
Medicine
Many, many subjects obscured by mainstream
medicine.
http://kunstler.com/podcast/kunstlercast-303-jack-albert-unwinding-human-predicament/
Jack Alpert is director of Stanford Knowledge Integration
Lab, a Lab which he started in 1978 at Stanford University. In
1992 the Lab left Stanford and became a non profit research
foundation. The research focused on how people gather and
process information to understand dynamic systems. Over the
years the Lab has transitioned its focus to the relationship
between human cognition and civilization viability. The
current work is on discovering and implementing behavior that
“changes our course” and creates a sustainable civilization.
Mr. Alpert predicts that the human population will be reduced
by 90 percent before the year 2100.
Direct Download: http://traffic.libsyn.com/kunstlercast/KunstlerCast_303.mp3
http://www.skil.org/
Stanford Knowledge Integration
Laborator
Tour of the Human Predicament and What to Do About it
We live in exciting times. It's my belief that "you
personally" will most likely die of starvation or conflict
between 2040 to 2075. You will experience a collapse of human
civilization, a 90% die-off of humans, a destruction of the
ecosystem, a loss of access to mined and drilled resources,
and a dark age from which your descendent's will not reemerge.
If your kids survive to 2100 they will have been cannibals and
will live like 17th century serfs -- no electricity, no
running water, no schools, no medicine, and life will be
short, nasty, and brutish.
Your first task in preparing for this tour is to decide if I
have any good reasons for believing this.
a) If you think I don't, for example technology will solve all
my worries, then your view of the future means we don't have
to change civilization's course.
b) If after investigation, you find that I have good reasons,
your second task is to use what you have learned about how
civilizations develop to chart a different course.
To understand the causes and cures of "temporal blindness" and
thus create "cognition based solutions to global problems"
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/07/31/15161/nuclear-weapons-lab-employee-fired-after-publishing-scathing-critique-arms-race
Nuclear weapons lab employee fired
after publishing scathing critique of the arms race
Los Alamos lets a 17-year employee go after retroactively
classifying his published article
By Douglas Birch
...They claimed that the article, an impassioned critique
of the political theories undergirding the nuclear arms race
and a defense of President Obama’s embrace of a nuclear
weapons-free future, contained classified information....
https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-february-march-2013-3db7/55-1-02-doyle-a88b
XXX By: James E. Doyle
Publication: Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
February–March 2013 / Pages: 7-34 / Volume: 55 / Edition
number: 1 / Date: 01 February 2013
On 5 April 2009 in Prague, US President Barack Obama
asserted the United States’ commitment to ‘seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons’. He was adding
his voice and the efforts of his administration to the growing
number of world leaders, citizens and civil-society
organisations seeking the elimination of such weapons.1
Banning the bomb has been a passionate and often popular
crusade since its creation and first use, but in all that time
it has never been a serious strategic objective for any state
that possessed nuclear weapons.2 Why would a sitting US
president take the political and strategic risk of declaring
that progress towards this goal was a key element of America’s
national security policy?
There is no simple answer. A vast and complex set of
interests, issues, theories, experiences and beliefs
influences individual and national views on nuclear weapons,
views that span the range of practical, political, moral and
psychological understanding. Some recent arguments for
eliminating nuclear weapons cover new ground and derive from
the belief that the twenty-first-century global security
environment differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War.
Some proponents claim that historical changes have undermined
the ability of nuclear weapons and deterrence to provide
security benefits to most nations. Others challenge earlier
calculations of the value of such weapons and assessments of
the balance between the risks and benefits of a strategy of
nuclear deterrence.
Moreover, recent scholarship in the fields of history and
deterrence theory questions deeply held beliefs regarding how
nuclear weapons might influence the behaviour of national
decision-makers. For example, declassified official documents
from the Cold War reveal occasions when nuclear catastrophe
was avoided by luck or seemingly random events rather than by
the clearly identifiable operation of nuclear deterrence.
There are further examples where existential characteristics
of alerted nuclear forces appear to have caused crises that
nearly resulted in their use. Finally, a growing number of
strategists and technical and political elites regard nuclear
weapons and deterrence theory as anachronistic. Some view the
whole idea of nuclear weapons as out of step with today’s
global threats, understanding of power and notions of human
rights and the rule of law. Emerging structural changes in the
international system (such as globalisation) undercut
traditional theories of nuclear deterrence, while trends in
information technology make possible much more agile and
discriminate forms of military power. These arguments dovetail
with others that assert that our greater understanding of the
Earth’s environmental systems and humankind’s interdependence
with those systems has made eliminating nuclear weapons more
salient. A quite limited exchange of nuclear weapons against
urban areas could trigger or accelerate global climatic
catastrophe (cooling rather than warming), leading to the
deaths of millions who had been uninvolved in the conflict
itself. Many citizens, scientists and laymen alike, view
nuclear-weapons abolition as an essential milestone in the
development of human civilisation, a moral, ideological and
practical campaign that could catalyse the transformation of
international relations and improve the outlook for
civilisation at a critical time.
Humanity stands at an historic juncture, facing multiple
interconnected threats within a compressed timescale. Besides
the potential use of nuclear weapons, these include
environmental degradation, resource scarcity, climate change,
overpopulation, global disease pandemics, financial crises and
natural disasters. The sort of international cooperation
needed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons is similar to
that needed to address these other transnational threats.
Elimination of nuclear weapons would at least symbolically
improve the chances of successfully addressing other
existential threats.
Obama, and others who seek a world without nuclear weapons,
are right. Eliminating nuclear weapons is profoundly in the
national-security interest of the United States and its allies
and friends. Without major progress towards the elimination of
nuclear arms, moreover, it is unlikely that the world will be
able to avoid nuclear use for a prolonged period or respond
adequately to security challenges related to climate change,
resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The
international community must reject the myths and expose the
risks of the ideology of nuclear deterrence if it is to
successfully meet the mutual global challenges of the
twenty-first century.
Challenging myths
The United States and the other nuclear-armed nations have
long maintained the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter
acts of aggression against them. During the hostile
ideological conflict of the Cold War, strategists on both
sides concluded that only the prospect of mutually assured
destruction would instil prudence and prevent decision-makers
from issuing political or military challenges that bore a high
risk of leading to military conflict.3 The strategy of nuclear
deterrence was adopted in the West, reluctantly, as the least
bad choice for managing what was believed to be an all-out
struggle with Soviet Communism for domination of the planet
and the social and political ideology of humankind. The
‘balance of terror’ and ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD)
were not desirable strategies; they were viewed as the best
that could be achieved given the circumstances of the Cold
War. This was despite universal agreement that an exchange of
nuclear attacks in response to aggression would inflict
unprecedented damage on the citizens and territory of a
nation.4 The use of nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 embedded the overwhelmingly
destructive nature of the bomb deeply into the collective
psyche. Given no clear alternatives, national-security elites
accommodated themselves to the paradox of nuclear deterrence
and devised complex theoretical formalisms claiming that the
risks of such a strategy were manageable and acceptable. In
the world of nuclear deterrence, strategists were reconciled
to the fact that, in order to be safe, you had to be willing
to be crazy. As Winston Churchill put it in 1955, safety would
‘be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother
of annihilation’.5
The world of 2013 is dramatically different, and it will
change even more profoundly in the decades ahead. The question
today is whether a strategy based on nuclear deterrence
continues to be the most effective way for governments to deal
with international tensions and protect themselves, or whether
alternative strategies with greater benefits and lower risks
are available. The answer depends in part on how our
understanding of nuclear deterrence has evolved and whether it
remains as stable and salient as the majority of the strategic
community believed it to be during the Cold War.
Weapons of acceptable risk?
No one doubts the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war.
The rapid destruction of even a small number of major urban
areas in any nation would bring unprecedented devastation and
loss of life. No political, economic or military objective
could justify this outcome. Nor does anyone believe that any
human or technological device, system or tool will operate
forever without failure or error. Yet we accept the risk of
nuclear war that accompanies reliance on a strategy of nuclear
deterrence because we perceive that risk to be low and because
no mainstream school of strategic thought is promoting an
alternative.
The concept of risk includes the relationship between the
consequences and probability of an event. If the consequences
of an event are extremely negative, such as the devastation
resulting from nuclear war, then you want the probability of
the event occurring to be vanishingly small, as close to zero
as possible. But the questions of the probability of nuclear
war and what factors cause changes in this probability over
time have seen little scientific or scholarly analysis. This
is a glaring omission in strategic discourse. We know that
nuclear deterrence can fail, either through poor decisions,
escalation during a crisis, a series of mechanical and human
errors, or malicious acts that lead to inadvertent use.6 It
has nearly failed several times, the most famous example being
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
A chain of events leading to nuclear war can emerge even when
no political leader believes it is in the interest of the
state to initiate war, and both sides act in a manner intended
to avoid it. The long list of nuclear accidents, malfunctions,
mishaps, false alarms and close calls, often initiated by
mechanical and human error, continues to grow. Such incidents
include crashes of nuclear-armed aircraft and submarines,
warning systems mistaking flocks of geese or reflections of
sunlight for enemy missile launches, maintenance crews
dropping tools and blowing up missile silos, and the temporary
loss or misplacement of nuclear weapons.7
In 2002 it was revealed that two episodes during the Cuban
Missile Crisis had brought nuclear war much closer than had
been previously realised. On 26 October 1962, the destroyer
USS Beale tracked and dropped small charges (the size of hand
grenades) on a Soviet submarine to signal it to surface.
Unknown to the US Navy, the submarine was armed with a nuclear
torpedo with a 15-kilotonne warhead. Running out of air, the
Soviet vessel was surrounded by American warships and
desperately needed to surface, but was also considering
defending itself. The captain ordered the arming of the
nuclear torpedo, and the political officer concurred.
Fortunately, the submarine brigade commander was also on
board; he overruled the captain and defused the threat of a
nuclear attack on the American fleet that would have almost
surely brought on a nuclear response.
The US military and intelligence services, too, were unaware
that Soviet nuclear warheads for tactical missiles had already
arrived in Cuba by September 1962. The shorter-range systems
were operational by the time President John F. Kennedy was
considering military action to destroy the missile bases in
October. Based on incomplete knowledge, his military advisers
considered the chances low that US conventional attacks on the
Cuban missile sites would escalate to nuclear war. But they
were unaware that the local Soviet commanders of the
tactical-missile bases had been given the authority to launch
their missiles if attacked. If US air-strikes had been
ordered, as several high-ranking military leaders recommended,
it is very likely that a nuclear exchange would have followed,
potentially escalating to direct attacks on US and Soviet
cities.
The risk of deterrence failure remains significant. Nuclear
deterrence is a complex, tightly coupled system. It is
vulnerable to the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of
human error, mechanical failure and accident.8 If it fails, as
nearly all such systems eventually do, it is likely to fail
catastrophically and cause unprecedented human suffering. The
American public (and the citizens of other nuclear-armed
states) should demand that their governments conduct
probabilistic risk assessments of scenarios that could result
in the use of nuclear weapons.9 The nuclear, chemical, health
and transportation industries are required to use this science
to justify the safety of many actions and products and
demonstrate that risks have been systematically identified and
accounted for. Why should we demand less of the institutions
we trust with our defence? Without an attempt to determine the
probability of deterrence failure under variety of postulated
scenarios, it is impossible to conduct a rational risk–benefit
assessment of maintaining nuclear deterrence as a key element
of national-security strategy.
Weapons of peace and strength?
Following the use of nuclear weapons against Japan, and in the
absence of nuclear war between nuclear-armed nations, a
powerful belief in the strategic benefits of nuclear weapons
emerged. A central pillar of this belief was the assumption
and assertion by most observers in the West that the US atomic
bombings were the decisive factor in Japan’s decision to
surrender. This allowed the claim that the use of atomic
weapons actually saved tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of
American and Japanese lives by ending the war without the need
to invade the Japanese Home Islands. Supporters of nuclear
deterrence also claim that it has proved to be one of the most
effective tools ever devised to avoid warfare between major
states.10 This belief is understandable, given the frequency
of conventional war prior to the development of nuclear
weapons and the relative absence of direct warfare between
major powers after they acquired nuclear arms. The
national-security elite of many nations has embraced these two
views, that nuclear weapons can be decisive in conflict and
can prevent conflict from occurring. Indeed, they have become
canons of strategic thought, though curiously much more so
among civilian defence experts than among military
professionals who might be called on to the use the weapons.
Recent scholarship has challenged both the logic and
historical accuracy of arguments supporting the efficacy of
nuclear weapons in the war against Japan and the view that
nuclear deterrence is the leading cause of the absence of
great-power war since 1945.11 For example, there is an
emerging view among historians that the entry of the Soviet
Union into the Pacific War on 9 August 1945 was more decisive
in Japan’s decision to surrender than the threat of further
atomic bombings. Japan was already largely defeated and lacked
the armed strength or industrial capacity to fight a two-front
war. The conventional bombing of Japanese cities had inflicted
similar or greater devastation than the atomic bombs but had
failed to prompt surrender. Moreover, careful analysis of the
correspondence and behaviour of the Japanese leadership
reveals a stronger reaction to the Soviet declaration than to
the atomic bombings.12
Nor did nuclear weapons end interstate conflict, even between
nuclear powers. The specific causes of the absence of major
war on the European continent or between the United States and
the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1991 cannot be known. But a
disciplined thought experiment into the most likely causes of
this relative calm would seek evidence that there was indeed
an intent to use military force on the part of a state facing
a nuclear power and that leaders failed to employ force
because of their fear of nuclear war. Such evidence is scarce,
especially outside the context of crises generated by
accidents and misperceptions between great powers, which
continued despite the presence of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
during those crises the existence of nuclear weapons escalated
the level of tension and put decision-makers in situations
where the probability of miscalculation and human error was
increased. This raises the possibility that the traditional
view of nuclear deterrence as a crisis stabiliser may be
incorrect.
Another approach to investigating the role that nuclear
weapons may have played in the Cold War calm would be to
control for other plausible explanations of war-avoidance
during the period. Could a lack of intent to use military
force for less than vital national objectives be a significant
cause of the peace? How about an aversion to the devastating
consequences of major conventional war by leaders and
citizens, many of whom had experienced it twice in their
lifetimes?13 Finally, can one dismiss completely the notions
that major war became less likely as a result of shifts in the
political orientation of national governments, growing
economic and cultural interdependence, or advances in
information, life-sciences and environmental technology?
Certainly it is plausible that regional security alliances,
ongoing East–West security dialogues and the evolution of
European integration played a role in avoiding a third world
war.14 These alternative explanations have not been
exhaustively explored and they cannot be dismissed. That
Western scholars and strategists since the Cold War have
largely neglected them is unfortunate. This is not to say that
nuclear weapons played no role in keeping the peace, but it is
reasonable to conclude that the absence of major war between
states during this period had multiple causes and it is
possible that nuclear weapons played only a minor role. Yet no
thorough, peer-reviewed scholarly effort has been conducted
which attempts to assign and defend accurate weights or
degrees of influence that the various causes may have played
in the historical outcome.
It is clearly unreasonable to assert that evidence supports
the claim that nuclear deterrence was the major cause of
war-avoidance. This assertion is a belief, unsupported by
anything approaching a strong, clear body of historically
documented evidence. In fact, there is little reason to claim
that the long peace since the Second World War is any more
likely a blessing of the nuclear age than the logical
conclusion of a substantial historical process, and one for
which, contrary to proponents of nuclear deterrence, there are
earlier precedents. Some scholars challenge even the view that
the post-war peace is a true historical anomaly that needs any
special explanation.15 The problem with the strength of the
belief that nuclear deterrence caused the so-called long peace
is that it biases strategic thinking in a way that increases
faith in the value of nuclear weapons without firm evidence.
This perception of high value increases tolerance for the
risks of nuclear deterrence.
The historical evidence that has emerged since the end of the
Cold War further weakens the argument that nuclear deterrence
was the leading cause of peace. After studying the Soviet
Union’s political and military archives and interviewing
members of the General Staff, scholars have learned that there
was never any intent on the part of the Soviet Union to invade
Western Europe or attack the United States. Despite the fact
that conventional wisdom in the West claimed that the Soviets
were working on a nuclear force posture that would enable them
to win a nuclear war, the Soviet military leadership actually
considered victory to be unattainable in any meaningful sense.
According to first-hand interviews conducted after 1991, the
Soviet General Staff understood the devastation that would
result from a nuclear war and therefore did not develop a
working definition of victory.16 Ironically, but not
unsurprisingly, the Soviets perceived the United States to be
preparing for a first strike. This predominance of worst-case
mirror-imaging, with both sides assuming the other believed it
could win, and was therefore likely to start a nuclear war,
challenges the claim that nuclear weapons tend to improve
communication between adversaries. In the US–Soviet case, it
appears that just the opposite was true. Rather than
contributing to war-avoidance, it appears that the strategy of
nuclear deterrence was largely irrelevant to deterring a major
US–Soviet or NATO–Soviet war. Neither side ever saw an
advantage in initiating such a conflict in the first place.17
In addition to the uncertain contribution made by nuclear
weapons to the absence of direct US–Soviet warfare during the
Cold War, it is clear they have played a negligible role in
the absence of conflict between Russia and the United States
for the past 20 years. That peace is much more satisfactorily
explained by the lack of fundamental political and ideological
conflict and the development of a much greater range of mutual
interests between the former adversaries. The low remaining
risk of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is
due far less to their nuclear deterrent relationship than it
is to the inherent dangers of their continued deployment and
operation of alert nuclear forces that are susceptible to
accident, theft or inadvertent or unauthorised use.
The contribution that nuclear weapons make today to deterring
the most likely threats to the security of the United States
and its allies is also dubious. America exists in a world
where none of the other states possessing nuclear arms (with
the possible exception of North Korea, the strength of whose
rudimentary nuclear-weapons capabilities remains unknown) has
state goals or conducts a foreign policy fundamentally hostile
to the interests of the United States. Today, a terrorist
attack is thought to be much more likely than an attack by
another state. US nuclear weapons do not deter terrorist
attacks. Al-Qaeda has attacked the United States, Great
Britain, Pakistan, several NATO countries, and Israeli
citizens and interests. Russia has also suffered terror
attacks. All these states possess nuclear arms or are in
alliance with nuclear powers.
The existence of nuclear weapons in the age of global
terrorism creates a very real security liability for all
states. The key uncertainty in the current security
environment is not whether nations will be attacked by
terrorists and non-state actors but whether such actors will
acquire the means to move from conventional to nuclear
explosives, making their inevitable attacks of much greater
consequence. To prevent nuclear attack by terrorists and
sub-state actors, states must successfully devise a strategy
of denying them the ability to acquire nuclear weapons.
Current strategic trends run counter to this objective. More
nuclear-weapons materials are being produced, more knowledge
relevant to the construction of nuclear weapons is being
dispersed, and terrorist organisations are becoming more
interested in acquiring nuclear capabilities.
The priorities and requirements of this approach are vastly
different from a nuclear deterrent strategy. Such a strategy
of denial places priority on achieving absolute minimal
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials throughout the
world and preventing their spread to other states, because
that spread increases the likelihood that terrorists could
acquire them. A denial strategy also emphasises the need for
the most effective security possible for the nuclear weapons
and nuclear materials that do exist. But perfect security for
such items can never be achieved. In September 2007, for
example, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were
mistakenly carried on a B-52 strategic bomber from North
Dakota to Louisiana, where they sat on a runway for hours
without proper security because no one knew they were there.18
Such incidents highlight the fact that the ultimate objective
of a denial strategy is the elimination of all nuclear weapons
and weapons-grade fissile materials so that there are none
that could fall into terrorist hands. In seeking a world free
of nuclear weapons, Obama is also seeking the security of a
world with a drastically lower risk of nuclear terrorism.
Weapons of caution and stability?
Another claim made by advocates of nuclear deterrence is that
it induces caution during crises, makes leaders more
risk-adverse and more hesitant to take military action, and
allows the resolution of crises before they escalate into
major military exchanges.19 This is perhaps the hope Churchill
had in mind when he said ‘safety will be the sturdy child of
terror’. Belief in the ability of nuclear weapons to
ameliorate historical shortcomings in the war-avoidance skills
of national leaders grew during the Cold War as no major war
broke out and several US–Soviet crises passed without the use
of such weapons. This was accepted as evidence of the benefits
of nuclear deterrence.
But explanations of war-avoidance during these episodes based
on post-Cold War historical research, including first-hand
interviews with participants, have little to do with the
theoretical operation of nuclear deterrence and much more to
do with luck and personal judgement. Former Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara noted that the decision-making process
in Washington, as well as in Moscow and Havana, during the
Cuban Missile Crisis was characterised by ‘misinformation,
miscalculation, and misjudgment’.20
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to send to Cuba
nuclear missiles that could strike the United States was a
reckless, high-risk action, the sort of thing
nuclear-deterrence theory predicts would be avoided. The
Soviet Union knew by 1961 that the United States considered
the Castro revolution to be a threat to US security and was
willing to use military force to support counter-revolution.
Moscow had also been informed by the United States that any
Soviet transfer of offensive weaponry to Cuba would be
opposed. Despite this, Khrushchev and his foreign minister,
defence minister and commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces
(all of whom understood the potential for nuclear war and its
consequences) decided to offer nuclear missiles to Cuba.21
Adding to the risk of this decision was the manner in which it
was implemented. Offensive missiles and 162 nuclear warheads
were secretly transported to the island beginning in July
1962. Following growing concern about the intensifying
Soviet–Cuban military relationship and the discovery of
evidence that nuclear missiles might be headed to Cuba, US
Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington on 4 September. Dobrynin told
Kennedy that he was instructed by Khrushchev to assure the US
side that no surface-to-surface or offensive missiles would be
placed in Cuba. The same day President Kennedy made a public
statement that ‘the gravest of issues would arise’ if any
offensive missiles were installed in Cuba. Three days later
Dobrynin repeated to US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson the Soviet
pledge that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba.
Soviet leaders had to know that their attempted deception of
individuals directly involved in crisis decision-making would
further raise the stakes and narrow the room for potential
negotiation. The discovery of the deception was sure to add
anger and personal betrayal to the atmosphere of objective
crisis, making compromise or movement towards re-establishing
even the slimmest element of mutual trust more difficult.
Examples of Cold War misjudgement, misperception and poor
communication are not limited to the Soviet side and did not
stop after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In November 1983, US
leadership and intelligence services failed to grasp the true
extent of Soviet anxiety regarding events surrounding a NATO
command exercise code-named Able Archer. The Soviet Union
began preparations for a nuclear attack on the United States
because its leaders believed they had persuasive indications
that Washington was on the verge of launching a surprise
nuclear attack against them. The clearest evidence of the
failure of the US side to realise how genuinely alarmed the
Soviets were regarding the possibility of a US–NATO first
strike was the decision to add new features to the annual Able
Archer exercise in November 1983, including participation of
the US president and vice president and simulated
communications with the UK and NATO command in a practice
drill that took NATO forces through a full-scale simulated
release of nuclear weapons against the Soviets.
According to US intelligence sources, on the night of 8 or 9
November KGB headquarters sent a flash cable to its
intelligence officers in Western Europe advising them,
incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had gone on alert and
that troops at some bases were being mobilised. The cable
speculated that the alert might be the beginning of a
countdown to a surprise nuclear attack. According to Soviet
and CIA sources, Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft in Poland and
East Germany were placed on high alert status in response. In
the following days the Soviets realised that there had been no
actual alert of NATO forces, but they remained deeply
concerned about US intentions and America’s potential to
deliberately initiate a major war.
Deterrence theory claims that the fear of nuclear devastation
motivates military planners and political leaders to exercise
caution and seek an accurate understanding of a nuclear
rival’s intentions. The events surrounding Able Archer clearly
cast doubt on this claim. The United States and its NATO
allies either misperceived the Soviet sense of insecurity or
deliberately ignored it. Had they been aware of Soviet fears
and eager to moderate them, it is doubtful that some of the
more alarming features such as the nuclear release drill would
have been included in Able Archer 83.
Underappreciated risks and costs
It appears that the war scare that culminated with Able Archer
83 was a case of mutual intelligence failure and leadership
misperception, shortcomings that remain all too frequent in
the post-Cold War era. The fact that it happened 33 years
after the beginning of a nuclear deterrent relationship
between the United States and Soviet Union and brought the
chance of nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban
Missile Crisis is evidence against the so-called benefits of
nuclear deterrence on national decision-making. What if there
are no such benefits? What if nuclear-armed nations are just
as prone to stumbling into war or choosing to use military
force as they were prior to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons? The fundamental difference then would be the
magnitude of risk carried by states that choose to rely on
nuclear deterrence. If deterrence fails, millions, or even
hundreds of millions of civilians can be killed in less than a
day. Without nuclear weapons the consequences of military
conflict, even between great powers, would not be nearly as
severe. Sustained use of conventional weapons can be
devastating, and nuclear weapons could eventually be
reconstituted and used, but the time needed for either to
happen at least presents an opportunity to end hostilities
before cities are destroyed.
Nuclear weapons also inhibit the development of positive
relations between former rivals, as the unsteady progress in
the development of positive US–Russian relations since the end
of the Cold War demonstrates. How deeply can two nations
engage as partners while still proclaiming the capability and
willingness to destroy one another, just in case? To be sure,
sources of tension other than opposing nuclear forces exist in
the US–Russian relationship, but fundamental change would be
needed in the area of nuclear strategy before a true
partnership could be established. In the years ahead, the
value of a true security partnership with Russia and China for
both the United States and Europe is likely to be very high
indeed.
Current US nuclear posture with respect to Russia seems to be
completely out of step with declared policy. In 1994, Russia
and the United States reached a bilateral de-targeting
agreement which stated that ‘for the first time since the dawn
of the nuclear age – Russia and United States will not operate
nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are
adversaries’.22 But if Russia is not presumed to be a
potential adversary, three fundamental features of the current
US nuclear force structure and operating posture make little
sense.
Firstly, the force is too big. Without the need to target
Russia’s strategic forces there simply are not enough
plausible aim-points in the world for US nuclear weapons that
would require 1,500–2,000 operationally deployed warheads. For
example, in an extreme crisis, perhaps 50–100 nuclear weapons
at most would be needed to threaten devastation on Iran, North
Korea or China. Only Russia’s large and dispersed nuclear
force has historically justified US forces totalling thousands
of nuclear weapons. Secondly, there would be no need for
alerted weapons. No country other than Russia has the
capability to pre-empt the launch of US forces by destroying a
significant portion of them on the ground. Thirdly, US nuclear
weapons would not need the operational capability (in terms of
accuracy and destructive yield) to limit damage to the United
States by destroying Russian nuclear weapons at their
protected bases before they could be launched.
The inability of the United States and Russia to make more
rapid progress on reducing nuclear weapons and increasing
transparency regarding the roles and missions of remaining
weapons has created a source of continued misperception and
mistrust. America’s maintenance of large alerted nuclear
forces, even as it develops strategic missile defences,
naturally leads Russia to question America’s strategic
intentions. Russia’s retention of thousands of older
non-strategic nuclear weapons raises similar suspicions among
the NATO Allies. Given the generally positive nature of the
US–Russian relationship, the continued competitive mutual
nuclear entanglement hinders the development of truly
normalised relations. For example, there is no compelling
reason why US and Russian nuclear forces could not be safely
decoupled, with each nation building down to their own
strategic comfort level. The resulting asymmetries need not
create instability as long as the political relationship
remains positive.
The problem is that much of the US strategic community
continues to perceive Russia as a potential adversary, despite
pronouncements to the contrary. This limits their willingness
to reduce US nuclear counterforce or damaging-limitation
capabilities vis-à-vis Russian strategic forces and causes
them to advocate the maintenance of numerically large US
forces capable of prompt attacks. Those who support the
maintenance of large, accurate, prompt-use nuclear forces
claim that they are necessary as a hedge against the
possibility of a resurgent hostile Russia. However, recent
studies by the Department of Defense conclude that, even if
Russia did turn adversarial and increase its nuclear forces in
excess of US totals, the survivable capabilities of US forces
would continue to provide the ability to answer a Russian
attack with a devastating response.23 The Pentagon’s new
national security strategy document asserts that the United
States can meet all its deterrent goals with respect to the
full range of potential adversaries with a smaller nuclear
arsenal than it now possesses.24
The continued reliance on large nuclear forces and Cold
War-style nuclear deterrence has many costs. There is the cost
in terms of hindering positive development of relations with
Russia and China. The very risk of deterrence failure and the
accompanying constant fear of annihilation impose an
immeasurable psychological cost. If deterrence does fail, the
resulting human suffering could be unparalleled. There is also
a cost to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to
additional states and non-state actors. Embracing nuclear
deterrence encourages proliferation. By concluding that the
threat of nuclear use can help states manage a variety of
threats to national security and stability, proponents of
nuclear deterrence invite other states to seek nuclear weapons
to secure similar purported benefits.
Finally, there is the large financial cost of a nuclear
deterrent. Maintaining its current arsenal of over 10,000
nuclear warheads costs the United States approximately $31
billion annually. By comparison, the combined US international
diplomacy and foreign assistance budget is approximately $39bn
per year.25 Current plans call for the modernisation of US
nuclear weapons manufacturing infrastructure and the
construction of a new generation of nuclear missiles, bombers
and submarines. This will cost hundreds of billions of dollars
over the next 20 years. In a prolonged era of fiscal
constraint, and with the benefits of nuclear weapons
uncertain, this level of expenditure is unjustifiable. But
perhaps the greatest cost of continued reliance by most
nuclear-armed states on a strategy of nuclear deterrence is
that it mischaracterises the sources of danger in today’s
world and distracts decision-makers from adequately preparing
for the most likely future threats.
Strategic oldthink
In the realist tradition of international relations
theory, all nations are independent actors trying to maximise
their power and security in an anarchical world.26 Nations
initiate armed conflict as a means to advance or protect their
interests because they calculate the benefits of using
military force outweigh the risks of doing nothing in a
competitive system. Proponents of nuclear deterrence argue
that nuclear weapons changed the dynamics of this system by
raising the stakes and uncertainties of using military force,
making it less likely.27
There are many problems with this view. Firstly, states
possessing nuclear weapons have continued to use military
force in situations that could have led them into conflict
with other nuclear-armed nations. Nuclear weapons did not
deter NATO from using force in Kosovo in the late 1990s or
Russian military action in Georgia in 2008. Moreover, states
without nuclear weapons have even attacked those who possess
them, an outcome that flies in the face of the claims of
deterrence proponents. Nuclear weapons did not deter Egypt and
Syria from attacking Israel in 1973, Argentina from attacking
British territory in the 1982 Falklands War or Iraq from
attacking Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.
Secondly, the theory of nuclear deterrence says little about
how the roles of nuclear weapons might change in an
ever-evolving international system. The nature of threats to
individual nations and the stability of the international
system have changed dramatically since the introduction of
nuclear weapons. Examples of fundamental change include the
end of the Cold War and the emergence of large-scale
transnational terrorism. Another, more important change is the
increased degree of international security interdependence.
This increased interdependence is clear in the field of
economics, but it has also been highlighted by advances in our
scientific understanding of the interaction between the
Earth’s natural systems and the patterns of modern
civilisation. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than our
understanding of environmental science. A nation concerned
about the economic, public-health and security consequences of
atmospheric pollution, climate change, sea-level rise and
diminishing supplies of fresh water can implement laws and
policies that drastically reduce its pollution of air and
water within its own borders. But such a strategy is futile,
because the air above its borders and the water in its rivers
and aquifers is well mixed with pollutants from surrounding
nations. Only if all nations cooperate to reduce pollution can
any one of them substantially benefit from the effort. The
same is true for global disease pandemics and natural
disasters. These security threats affect many nations
simultaneously and individual national efforts to counter or
address them cannot be fully effective.
The interconnectedness of the issues of nuclear deterrence and
transnational environmental threats has been demonstrated by
two scientists, Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, who used
computer modelling techniques to simulate the climatic
consequences of a regional nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan. Their results show that even with the detonation of
nuclear weapons limited to the territories of the two
combatants, the smoke and dust raised into the atmosphere by
the nuclear explosions would eventually circle the globe,
killing crops and temporarily cooling the planet. Robock and
Toon project that nearly a billion people would die, the vast
majority civilians in nations outside the warring states.28
The implication of this analysis is that all countries have a
direct security interest in preventing nuclear war, anywhere.
It would be perfectly reasonable for the US joint chiefs of
staff to advise the secretary of defense and White House that
in order to protect the security of the US population, the
Pentagon must have the ability to forcibly prevent nuclear war
between India and Pakistan, or any other two countries. This
means that no matter what the reason for the war, or who
initiated hostilities, the security of the United States would
demand that Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons be destroyed
in flight or preemptively attacked on the ground before they
could be detonated and cause a global climatic catastrophe
that would kill thousands of Americans.
The US military and much of the broader national-security
community have recognised the seriousness of transnational
threats such as global climate change. The US Department of
Defense, for example, included climate threat as a key pillar
of its most recent Quadrennial Defense Review and the CIA has
established a Center for the Study of Climate Change. Despite
this growing awareness, the response remains inadequate and
the mechanisms for effective cooperation on transnational
threats remain underdeveloped.29 If we fail to slow climate
change or successfully adapt to its consequences, political
and military crises are likely to result.30 Nuclear deterrence
will be meaningless in these crises. Threats to use nuclear
weapons will lack credibility because carrying them out would
greatly worsen global environmental damage and its
consequences for all states, including those who used nuclear
weapons in an attempt to defend themselves or defeat their
rivals.
A teachable moment
The destructive power of nuclear weapons can create an
opportunity for a teachable moment unique in the history of
human civilisation. The universal threat of nuclear war marks
civilisation’s passage of a major milestone and reveals a
fundamental truth of the modern international security
environment. Technologically advanced nations have gained and
will forever now possess multiple means to destroy one
another. The number of nations with these capabilities will
inevitably increase as technical knowledge and skill spread
across the globe. Nuclear weapons may be only the first
example of such a capability. New and more devastating means
of human destruction may constantly appear as science and
technology advance.
We must learn that the greatest meaning of the nuclear
revolution is that every government facing a nuclear-armed
rival has been forced to conclude that ‘my adversaries’ sense
of security is now my concern’, and integrate that
understanding into strategy, force planning and operations.31
Paradoxically, certain actions that might increase a state’s
military capability against its rival are in fact contrary to
its interests because they could panic that competitor into
initiating nuclear war. This need to take the perceptions of
an enemy into account and accommodate them for the sake of
one’s own security is transformative.
The nuclear paradox can help us learn by providing clarity for
a valuable new understanding: the nearly instantaneous global
reach of nuclear weapons and their widespread proliferation
crystallises unlike any other human construction the fact that
seeking security from a purely nationalist perspective is
ineffective and unscientific. The physical, biological and
environmental sciences increasingly reinforce this and tell us
that there is no such thing as national security, there is
only international or collective security. The alternative is
collective insecurity.
Nuclear weapons can only have a positive legacy if we learn
from them. An international security system based the
willingness of nations to commit mutual suicide to protect
themselves has always been recognised as a sub-optimum
solution to the security dilemma. It is fraught with great
risk to the world’s nations and peoples and we should be
ceaselessly striving for more rational and humane ways to
achieve security. Nuclear disarmament has been pursued for
more than 60 years and enshrined as a law-backed international
goal not because it is the moralistic pipe-dream of the
uninformed citizenry, but because many serious practitioners
of international statecraft see it as an essential goal of a
sustainable international order.32
It is not beyond the capabilities of government leaders and
institutions to internalise the understanding that major war
between modern states can no longer produce security benefits.
It is not necessary to continue living with the risks of
nuclear deterrence in order reap the cautionary benefits
bestowed by the knowledge that modern nations can destroy one
another. President Ronald Reagan likened nuclear deterrence
based on mutually assured destruction to ‘two cowboys in a
frontier saloon aiming their guns at each other´s heads
permanently’. This is why he concluded that ‘nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought’.33
The nuclear taboo
Several scholars have argued that realist or traditional
models of state behaviour cannot adequately explain the fact
that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. They posit
that a powerful norm or taboo against nuclear use has emerged.
This taboo is based on the tradition of non-use, a growing
understanding of the difficulty of achieving military aims
with nuclear weapons and a deep moral revulsion to the
indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would bring
upon human populations and the environment.34
That such a taboo exists and has strengthened over the years
is indeed an affirmation that the idea of using nuclear
weapons in the name of national defence is viewed by most
people as morally illegitimate and incompatible with basic
human values. It is also welcome evidence of the existence and
strength of those values. Unfortunately, many observers regard
the nuclear taboo as a reason to believe that the risk of
nuclear war is overblown. They are confident that, despite the
vulnerability to unforeseen events and human and mechanical
error, nuclear weapons will not be used because controls are
adequate, cooler heads will prevail and no leader will want to
violate the mores and norms of the nuclear taboo.
Rather than being complacent with regard to existing reliance
on nuclear weapons and the attendant risks to civilisation, an
effort should be made to nurture and strengthen the taboo and
extend it to cover all military conflict among or against
nuclear-armed states. There is no compelling reason why
governments can’t realise that launching major war between
nuclear states carries such a high risk of leading to nuclear
use that they must, in essence, treat it with equal opprobrium
to nuclear use and adopt a taboo against major wars as well.
Why do we need the day-to-day presence of the threat of
nuclear destruction and the architecture that creates it to
benefit from the taboo against initiating Armageddon?
If human civilisation is to survive it must demonstrate that
violent conflict between major states is avoidable. This is
not a new or radical concept. It is the foundational principle
of the United Nations Charter that has been signed by 192 of
the world’s 195 nations. Reagan said that peace was not the
absence of conflict but the ability to resolve conflict by
peaceful means.
Like chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions
and anti-personnel landmines, nuclear weapons can be subjected
to international regimes that seek to prevent particularly
dangerous or inhumane technologies from being used for
military purposes. The regimes banning these weapons, while
not yet completely implemented, clearly demonstrate that it is
possible to eliminate major classes of military technology and
make their manufacture and use illegal. Giving up nuclear
weapons is neither impossible nor more dangerous than the
world we are living in and may indeed lead to a safer world.
In essence, the idea of nuclear deterrence based on the threat
of mutual destruction, or deterrence with any future
indiscriminate weapon of mass destruction, must become
universally taboo.
The view that nuclear weapons needed to be eliminated was
articulated as soon as they came into being, and the view that
the ideology of nuclear deterrence is incompatible with basic
human values and the positive development of human
civilisation is also as old as nuclear weapons themselves.
Most nations and people view nuclear weapons as a problem, not
a solution. At least 30 countries that could build such
weapons have chosen not to. Many of the bomb’s inventors,
including Robert Oppenheimer, were deeply troubled by its
potential destructiveness and argued against making it a
cornerstone of national security. The vast majority of
nations, 189 out of 195, have pledged never to acquire nuclear
weapons under the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
Nuclear weapons should be eliminated because they will not
make nations powerful in the twenty-first century and beyond.
Their existence in the arsenals of the world creates the
possibility of their use and the risks they create outweigh
their value. The marginal contribution that nuclear deterrence
now makes to the absence of major aggression between great
powers is being purchased at too high a price. That price is
the constant risk that a complex, tightly coupled and largely
automated system subject to normal, systemic and human error
will, as science tells us, inevitably fail, and fail
catastrophically, with unprecedented and unjustified loss of
civilian life. Mistakes with conventional weapons can have
limited physical impact. Small mistakes are not possible with
nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are useless for confronting and resolving the
most likely future international security challenges, but
steady progress towards the elimination of such weapons can
help nations confront these transnational problems. The
diplomatic and technical skills acquired through the creation
of treaties and institutions to effectively verify the
elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals can
provide powerful models and experience for addressing other
transnational threats. The elimination of nuclear weapons, a
project that will require 25–35 years, can thus be an
organising principle and set an example for the forms of
international cooperation, laws and institutions that are
required to manage other global challenges. Secondly,
elimination of nuclear weapons will allow creative,
intellectual, technical and financial resources now devoted to
nuclear threats to be focused toward the resolution of
transnational crises faced by all nations. As nuclear weapons
are drawn down those resources can be re-focused toward
developing clean energy, carbon-capture technologies, clean
water management and low-impact, high-productivity
agriculture.
Nuclear weapons should be eliminated because there is a real
historic opportunity to do so and because failing to do so
will imperil current and future generations as they try to
manage a host of inevitable global security problems.
Transformation in the way states interact will be necessary
before the last nuclear weapons are eliminated, but tangible
progress toward nuclear disarmament cannot await the
resolution of all international conflict. International
conflict existed before nuclear weapons were invented,
persists while states possess nuclear arsenals and will remain
after nuclear weapons are eliminated from those arsenals.
Obama said in Prague that the elimination of nuclear weapons
might not be achieved in his lifetime, but 2045 – 34 years
from now, when Obama will be 84 – will mark the 100th
anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan. Three-and-a-half
decades is time enough for the world to transition away from
the ideology of nuclear deterrence and to dismantle the system
of nuclear forces deployed in the name of national defence.
Each passing year will bring the need to support Obama’s
vision of a world free of nuclear weapons more sharply into
focus. The international community has the opportunity to
honour the memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by
eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world
within a century after they were unleashed.
Acknowledgements
This research received no specific grant from any funding
agency in the public, commercial, or not for-profit sectors.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and
do not represent those of the Los Alamos National Laboratory
or the US government.
Notes
1 See Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
Two major international public efforts to eliminate nuclear
weapons stand out: The Nuclear Security Project launched by
Sam Nunn, George Schultz, William Perry and Henry Kissinger at
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/site/c.mjJXJbMMIoE/b.3483737/k.4057/Nuclear_Security_Project_Home.htm
, and the Global Zero Project. For a summary of statements by
national governments supporting the elimination of nuclear
weapons see http://www.globalzero.org/en/who/governments.
2 See Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, A Short
History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
3 For classic treatments of nuclear deterrence theory see
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1966) and McGeorge Bundy, ‘To Cap the
Volcano’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 48, no. 1, November 1969.
4 For classic information on the consequences of nuclear war
see Sidney Drell and Frank von Hippel, ‘Limited Nuclear War’,
Scientific American, November 1976; Samuel Glasstone and
Philip J. Dolen (eds), Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed.
(Washington DC: US Department of Defense and Department of
Energy, 1977; Effects of Multiple Nuclear Explosions Worldwide
(Washington DC: National Acadey of Sciences, 1975); The
Effects of Nuclear War (Washington DC: US Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency, April 1979); William Daugherty, Barbara
Levi and Frank von Hippel, ‘The Consequences of “Limited”
Nuclear Attacks on the United States’, International Security,
vol. 10, no. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 3–43.
5 Churchill’s last speech is entitled ‘Never Despair’. It was
given to the House of Commons on 1 March 1955 and is available
at
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/102-never-despair.
6 While inadvertent or unintended use by the attacker is not a
classic failure of deterrence, its possibility can be regarded
as evidence of a vulnerability of deterrent systems. If
decision-makers are so rationally averse to nuclear war they
should only accept technical systems that have no potential
for error or malicious tampering. Unfortunately, such systems
do not exist. Furthermore, it will not much matter to the
victim of a nuclear attack that it was an accident. The desire
to retaliate will be overwhelming and under current doctrine
retaliation may even be initiated before the accidentally
launched weapons detonate.
7 See Geoffrey Forden, ‘False Alarms in the Nuclear Age’, NOVA
documentary, 6 November 2001, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/nuclear-false-alarms.html.
8 See Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations,
Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993), and Jaya Tiwari and Cleve J. Gray,
‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents’,
http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukeaccidents/accidents.htm.
9 Martin Hellman, professor of engineering at Stanford
University, is a leading advocate of this approach. See Martin
E. Hellman, ‘Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Bent of
Tau Beta Pi, Spring 2008, available at
http://nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf . See also Martin E. Hellman,
‘Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons’, 21 October 2008,
available at http://nuclearrisk.org/soaring.pdf.
10 See the comments by Bruno Tertrais in ‘Nuclear
Myth-Busting’, correspondence section of Nonproliferation
Review, vol. 16, no. 2, July 2009.
11 See Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’,
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 15, no. 3, November 2008; John
Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to
Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and McGeorge
Bundy, ‘The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy’, in
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds), International Politics:
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York:
HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 227–35.
12 See especially Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin,
Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2005); Sumio Hatano, ‘The Atomic Bomb and
Soviet Entry into the War: Of Equal Importance’, in Tsuyoshi
Hasagawa (ed.), The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
13 See John Mueller, ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear
Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World’, in The Cold War and
After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997),
pp. 45–69.
14 See John S. Duffield, ‘Explaining the Long Peace in Europe:
the Contributions of Regional Security Regimes’, Review of
International Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, October 1994, pp.
369–88.
15 For the argument that Cold War peace is nothing unusual see
Randolph M. Siverson and Michael Don Ward, ‘The Long Peace: A
Reconsideration’, International Organization, vol. 56, no. 3,
Summer 2002, pp. 679–91.
16 John A. Battilega, ‘Soviet Views Of Nuclear Warfare: The
Post-Cold War Interviews’, in Henry Sokolski (ed.), Getting
Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and
Practice, November 2004, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub585.pdf
.
17 Vojtech Mastny, War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War:
Threat Perceptions in the East and West (Abingdon: Routledge,
2006), pp. 3, 27.
18 Barbara Starr, ‘Air Force Investigates Mistaken Transport
of Nuclear Warheads’, CNN, 5 September 2007,
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-05/us/loose.nukes_1_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-warheads-missiles?_s=PM:US.
19 The nuclear deterrence literature is vast; for a sample of
major sources highlighting nuclear deterrent benefits see
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of
National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1961); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1974); and Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The Delicate Balance of
Terror’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2, January 1959, p.
213.
20 Bruce Allyn, James Blight and David Welch, ‘Essence of
Revision: Moscow, Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis’,
International Security, vol. 14, no. 3, Winter 1989–1990, pp.
136–72.
21 The facts surrounding the crisis are taken from a
chronology prepared for Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh
(eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (New York: The New
Press, 1992, 1998), and available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/590101_620919%20Chronology%201.pdf.
22 ‘Presidents Detarget Nuclear Missiles’, ITAR-TASS, 14
January 1994.
23 Hans Kristensen, ‘DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened
even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces’, FAS Strategic
Security Blog, 10 October 2012.
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/10/strategicstability.php
(Nov. 2012).
24 See US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012,
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
25 Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey, ‘Nuclear Security
Spending Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities’, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January, 2009, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2009/01/12/nuclear-security-spending-assessing-costs-examining-priorities/8uq.
26 For a sampling of the vast literature on the realist
tradition in international relations theory see John J.
Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after
the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 15, no. 1, Summer
1990, pp. 5–49; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations:
The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1954); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics
(Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979); George F. Kennan, Realities
of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1951); and Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A
Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and
Anette Baker Fox (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966).
27 See Frank Miller, ‘Disarmament and Deterrence: A
Practitioner’s View’ in George Perkovich and James M. Acton,
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2009),
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22748.
28 Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, ‘South Asian Threat? Local
Nuclear War=Global Suffering’, Scientific American, January
2010, http://www.scientificamerican.com/author.cfm?id=2220.
29 See Francesco Femia, Christine Parthemore and Caitlin
Werrell, ‘The Inadequate US Response to a Major Security
Threat: Climate Change’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
web edition, 20 July 2011,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-inadequate-us-response-to-major-security-threat-climate-change.
30 See Jeffrey Mazo, Climate Conflict: How Global Warming
Threatens Security and What to Do About It, Adelphi 409
(Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2010).
31 See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
32 Notable among these is George P. Shultz, William J. Perry,
Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, ‘A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.
33 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pp. 257–8, 265, 267–8, 550.
34 See Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States
and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Thomas Schelling, ‘The
Nuclear Taboo’, MIT International Review , Spring 2007,
http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2007/spring/taboo.pdf; T.V. Paul, The
Traditions of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2009); and William C. Potter, ‘In
Search of the Nuclear Taboo: Past, Present, and Future’,
Proliferation Papers, no. 31, Winter 2010, available at
http://www.ifri.org.
James E. Doyle is a nuclear security and non-proliferation
specialist at Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is the editor
of Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation:
Achieving Security With Technology and Policy (Elsevier,
2008).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRqan8QtMD0
Magnetic plant growth accelerator 2014
Starting to see some significant results this year after
changing the magnets for stronger ones.
https://imgur.com/AWjbdxa
This is why we need the Second Amendment.... Bravo to this
woman
A man pulls a gun on a group of women and tries to steal
something. One of the women pulls a gun out of her purse and
pops him good...
http://www.newsweek.com/childrens-iq-could-be-lowered-drinking-tap-water-while-pregnant-667660
Children's IQ Could Be Lowered By
Mothers Drinking Tap Water While Pregnant
By Dana Dovey
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/ehp655/
Prenatal Fluoride Exposure and
Cognitive Outcomes in Children at 4 and 6–12 Years of Age
in Mexico
Morteza Bashash, et al.
Conclusions: In this study, higher prenatal fluoride
exposure, in the general range of exposures reported for other
general population samples of pregnant women and nonpregnant
adults, was associated with lower scores on tests of cognitive
function in the offspring at age 4 and 6–12 y.
https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP655